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Over the past two decades there has been a number of global outbreaks of viral diseases. This has
accelerated the efforts to model and forecast the disease spreading, in order to find ways to confine
the spreading regionally and between regions. Towards this we have devised a model of geographical
spreading of viral infections due to human spatial mobility and adapted it to the latest Covid-19
pandemic. In this the region to be modelled is overlaid with a two-dimensional grid weighted with the
population density defined cells, in each of which a compartmental SEIRS system of delay difference
equations simulate the local dynamics (microdynamics) of the disease. The infections between cells
are stochastic and allow for the geographical spreading of the virus over the two-dimensional space
(macrodynamics). This approach allows to separate the parameters related to the biological aspects
of the disease from the ones that represent the spatial contagious behaviour through different kinds
of mobility of people acting as virus carriers. These provide sufficient information to trace the
evolution of the pandemic in different situations. In particular we have applied this approach to
three in many ways different countries, Mexico, Finland and Iceland and found that the model is
capable of reproducing and predicting the stochastic global path of the pandemic. This study sheds
light on how the diverse cultural and socioeconomic aspects of a country influence the evolution of
the epidemics and also the efficacy of social distancing and other confinement measures.
I. INTRODUCTION
In today’s globalised world people easily travel long
distances to faraway places, where they can get infected,
carry and consequently spread lethal and easily mutating
viruses that could subsequently lead to wide-spread epi-
demic or even pandemic of catastrophic proportions. Re-
cent examples of such globally spreading viral diseases are
the seasonal influenza, SARS, MERS, AH1N1 swine flu
and currently COVID-19 that is turning out to be rather
lethal showing growing death tolls in various countries.
This in turn causes a lot of concern among general pub-
lic and huge strain in national healthcare and hospital
capacities including their Intensive Care Units (ICUs),
but also among public authorities and governments as to
what measures, restrictions, recommendations to put in
place and when, to keep the society running in balance
with the rest of its socioeconomic functions.
In order to make decisions of these large scale, and
far reaching issues for mitigating the effects of the dis-
ease, one would need to take into account the pathologi-
cal aspects of the virus, epidemiological factors including
mechanisms of virus spreading, human sociality includ-
ing their social contacting, behavioural, mobility, trav-
elling and communication patterns, demographic factors
including age, gender, and regional density of popula-
tion as well as concentration in built environments, espe-
cially cities and public transportation volumes, terrestri-
ally and aerially.
The commonly accepted measures to counter the ef-
fect of these factors are recommendations for individuals
in terms of enhanced hygiene and keeping 1 to 2 me-
ter social or in fact physical distance, or the government
or local authority enforced restrictions for staying and
working at home in self-quarantine, requirement to wear
face mask in public places and transportation or even
curfews, allowing gatherings with only a small number
of people, lock-down of countries or districts by closing
schools, universities and other public institutions as well
as restaurants and shops, other than food markets, lim-
iting public local, terrestrial and aerial transportation as
well as non-essential entries to the countries or regions.
In addition, various countries have adopted compre-
hensive testing of even asymptomatic individuals to-
gether with tracking them with smart phone app. It
is evident that countries adopt, follow, and ease these
restriction and confinement measures in a number of dif-
ferent ways and with different timings, as many of them
tend to be strongly linked to the culture, politics, econ-
omy and overall well-being of the country. Furthermore,
there are collective effects due to news and social media
depending on how lethal the disease is perceived to be.
Over the past two decades a lot of effort and advance
have been made to get understanding of the population
level complex dynamics of infectious disease spreading [1–
3]. In this various epidemiological models - often com-
partmental SIRS (susceptible - infected - recovered - sus-
ceptible) type - have proved very versatile in implement-
ing the above described epidemically relevant factors for
qualitative and quantitative or predictive insight into the
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2cause of infection spreading [4–7]. Models including geo-
graphical spread and population heterogeneity have also
been developed [8–16], and recently, many models includ-
ing different aspects of pandemics have been developed,
see for example [17–20].
Therefore, it is interesting to study how these social
restrictions work and how efficient they are in countries
with different cultures and social habits. In this work we
decided to do a comparative study of three very differ-
ent countries, Mexico, Finland and Iceland. They differ
not only in population size and density, but also in case
of pandemic in their behavioural habits, restriction and
confinement policies, testing and tracking as well as how
individuals follow and respond to them and to authori-
ties. For this purpose we use a model [12] devised to deal
with the viral swine flu pandemics that started in Mexico
in 2009. The model is different from former studies [8–
10, 15], the aims of which were to mimic the development
of a particular epidemic by evaluating parameters from
specific data. This model enables us to study not only
the actual observed data, but also to predict the temporal
evolution of the disease under hypothetical and changing
scenarios of social distancing and confinement measures
in a given geographical region.
II. MODEL
A. SEIRS epidemiological model (Microdynamics)
The model used in this study is an extension of the one
presented earlier by Barrio et al. [12], and it considers the
geographical spread of the epidemics at two levels: the
local dynamics and more global transmission of the dis-
ease from one place to another. For this purpose, a two-
dimensional grid of a country or region is constructed in
such a way that within each cell (i, j) the population den-
sity ρ(i, j) is considered to be homogeneous. For the local
dynamics a Susceptible - Exposed - Infected - Recovered
(-Susceptible) or SEIR(S) model [21] is used for each
cell, consisting of four compartments: not infected sus-
ceptible (X), exposed yet not infectious (E), infectious
(Y ), and recovered temporary immune (Z), representing
an instantaneous local average state of the population.
In the model the periods of latency (), infectious-
ness (σ) and immunity (ω) are assumed to be constant
and dimensionless by expressing them in units of a time
scale τ of one day. Here we assume that the popula-
tion size does not change throughout the simulation, i.e.
N = X+E+Y +Z = constant and for the mortality we
assume an exponential functional form with a constant
rate µ = 1/L, where L is the life expectancy, and the
birth rate is µN with all the newborn considered suscep-
tible. As people who have recovered do not necessarily
become susceptible again, because of long lasting immu-
nity or changes in social behaviour, the actual fraction of
population that becomes susceptible (S) is included.
Considering all these assumptions, we can now express
the flow rates per day for all the variables by the following
map equations on each cell α = (i, j):
Xt+1(α) = q
[
Xt(α)−Gt(α) + SqbGt−1−b(α)
]
+ µN,
Et+1(α) = q [Et(α) +Gt(α)− qGt−1−(α)] ,
Yt+1(α) = q [Yt(α) + q
Gt−1−(α)− qaGt−1−a(α)] ,
Zt+1(α) = q
[
Zt(α) + q
aGt−1−a(α)− qbGt−1−b(α)
]
.
(1)
where q = (1 − µ), a = ( + σ), and b = ( + σ + ω).
Unlike in case of other SEIRS models, in our model
the probability of becoming infectious is not based on
the mass action principle, but instead we use a bio-
logically more sensible incidence function: Gt(i, j) =
ρ(i, j)Xt(i, j)[1 − exp−βYt(i,j)] [21], where β is a dimen-
sionless constant representing the transmission parame-
ter.
The model exhibits a rich variety of behaviours, as
expected: regular oscillations of different period, damped
oscillations, quasi-periodicity, chaos and stable regimes.
Therefore, the dynamics of other infectious diseases can
be modelled with the same system, since all parameters
so far, except the population density, characterise the
disease, such as its virulence and lethality. In this study
We shall give specific values to these parameters when
applied to the specific country or region of COVID-19,
as discussed below.
B. Geographical disease spreading
(Macrodynamics)
In each cell the relative population is represented by
a population density matrix ρ(i, j). The size of each cell
is determined by the actual conditions of the country or
region to be simulated. The model in each cell represents
an instantaneous local average state there, and the dis-
ease can be transmitted from one cell to another because
people move distances larger than the cell size. There-
fore, the size of each cell should be congruent with the
average distance that a person travels every day, to work
or shopping, etc.
Here we consider three mobility mechanisms:
1. Cell to cell transmission is often modelled as a dif-
fusion process, but this implies that the susceptible
receives a certain amount of infection, and the in-
fectious one becomes healthier by the same amount.
Other SEIR models consider anomalous diffusion
with fractional derivatives, which seems to be more
appropriate [17]. An alternative approach is to con-
sider a parameter of average terrestrial mobility or
velocity, vt, which we assume to be stochastic in
nature. Therefore, we can model the probability of
spreading the disease from one cell to neighbour-
ing cells by using a Metropolis Monte-Carlo algo-
rithm. First, one locates the potential spreader
3cells, this means having Yt(i, j) ≥ η, where η is
related to the infectiousness of the disease. Then,
one chooses a random number from a uniform dis-
tribution (p ∈ [0, 1]), and if p is smaller than vt,
a neighbour cell (denoted by α) becomes infected,
that is X(α) = 1− η and Y (α) = η. It is clear that
we know very little about the real meaning of vt,
since the reasons for people to making a trip are
quite varied. In this sense, vt is related to the so-
cial and cultural habits of the individuals, and it is
related to the average number of personal contacts
per day.
2. Particular attention has been drawn on the in-
fluence of air travelling upon the spread of dis-
eases [20, 22–27]. A similar stochastic process is
used to model transmission from a cell to other
more distant cells, connected by airlines. In this
case, the probability of spreading the infection is
proportional to the number of passengers per day
travelling from one airport to another airport. This
should be simulated by locating the airports in the
grid and defining an air mobility parameter va. The
probability of infection is represented by a weighted
adjacency matrix (A) of the airline network, whose
elements represent the average number of passen-
gers between linked airports. Then, we run once
again the Metropolis Monte-Carlo algorithm by us-
ing va to decide infectiousness between the elements
of A (cells including the airports).
3. Since people seemingly travel randomly between
distant places, noise has to be considered. This will
cause the spread of the epidemics to unexpected
places. In order to simulate this we introduce a
Monte-Carlo procedure, similar to the geographi-
cal spread of the illness. Therefore, we consider
cells (i, j) in which there are not many susceptible
(Xt(i, j) < η) at random, and compare the value of
a random number p0 with a quantity of the form
e−1/kT , since these random displacements can be
considered analogous to the “kinetic energy” kT or
“temperature” T of the system. If the Monte Carlo
condition is fulfilled, then one starts the disease in
that cell.
III. APPLICATION TO THE COVID-19
EPIDEMICS IN MEXICO, FINLAND AND
ICELAND
As in this model the biological parameters are clearly
separated from those related to social, cultural, and eco-
nomic phenomena, one could adjust the biological param-
eters according to present knowledge. For the COVID-19
the latency, , is thought to be from 2 to 14 [19, 28] days,
though interestingly,  = 1 improved the adjustment of
the data; the infectiousness σ = 14 is set to the standard
âĂĲquarantineâĂİ time used in many countries; the im-
munity ω is yet unknown, but for SARS-CoV antibodies
and memory T-cell response were detected 1 year or even
longer after the infection [29, 30]. To be conservative,
here we use ω = 140. Currently there are no data about
transmission parameter β and disease infectiousness pa-
rameters η, so we estimated them to be β = 0.91 and
η = 0.1, by adjusting Mexican data fromMarch 3 to April
13. As we assume that these parameters to be epidemio-
logically relevant for COVID-19, we use them unchanged
for the three countries studied here. However, the mobil-
ity parameters were adjusted for each country taking into
account different strategies and measures used in them to
mitigate the effect of the pandemic.
A. The case of Mexico
In order to illustrate the results obtained from the
model, we use the geographical demographic data of
Mexico from INEGI [31] and from the John Hopkins Uni-
versity (J.H.) map [32] and apply it to the outbreak of
COVID-19 in 2020. The frequency of air travel and the
number of passengers per day in Mexico were obtained
from Dirección General de Aeronáutica Civil of the Sec-
retaría de Comunicaciones y Transportes [33].
In Mexico the first imported case occurred in Mex-
ico City (central Mexico) on the 28th of February, and
shortly after more imported cases were reported, one
in Mexico City, other in Cancun (Yucatan peninsula) ,
other in Baja California and another in Sinaloa (northern
Mexico). Mexican government together with Ministry of
Health (SecretarÃŋa de Salud) implemented some mea-
sures such as tracking COVID-19 positive people and
their contacts. On March 14th, the Ministry of Pub-
lic Education (SecretarÃŋa de EducaciÃşn PÃžblica) ex-
tended vacations in primary and high schools until April
20th in the whole country; some days latter this period
was extended until April 30th. On March 18th univer-
sity students were sent home and social distancing was
initiated. On March 23th, at national level, Universities
were closed as well as public places such as concerts, the-
atres, cinemas, churches, museums, gyms, zoos, and bars;
home confinement was recommended. Airports were not
closed, but they diminished their operations to only a
small percentage of flights and passenger volumes. On
March 26th non-essential activities of the government
were suspended, and on March 30th non-essential eco-
nomic activities at national level were suspended until
April 30th.
On April 13th we made a calculation adjusting the
mobility parameters to the data available from the John
Hopkins page [32]. The values which best fitted the data
were: vt = 0.1, va = 0.02, and kT = 0.8. These values
represent an overall mobility reduction of approximately
35 % of the normal values. There is also the possibility
that the survival parameter S changes in time, if there
are tests to detect potentially infectious people, or if there
4are vaccines or effective medication. So far this has not
happened, so we used S = 0.1, throughout the calcula-
tions.
On May 25th the Mexican authorities announced a
plan to lift the restrictions gradually, and asynchronously,
considering the situation of the pandemic in each state.
Consequently, the three mobility parameters and the fre-
quency of flights would change with time slowly, from
May to August assuming that the mobility will be re-
stored to 50% of the value before the outbreak.
FIG. 1. Geographical numerical calculations of the model
with parameters appropriate for Covid-19. The prediction
in this plot was made on April 13th, with the adjustments
made from data up to that date. The black line assumes
that mobility restrictions do not change during the year, while
the red line was obtained by feeding the mobility strategy
announced by the government to lift restrictions gradually.
In Fig.1 we show examples of numerical calcula-
tions performed with these two hypothetical conditions,
namely without lifting the restrictions, and following the
plan to restore normality. Observe that the effect of lift-
ing the restrictions is very small, but noticeable: the peak
is attained around the 9th of July, in both cases, but
taller when lifting, and the epidemic dies off faster than
in the case of doing nothing. However, the number of
infected people would remain practically the same.
In Fig. 2 we show an average of 50 realisations of the
time history of the pandemic and it is seen to model
very closely the actual data. This means that although
costly economically, the social distancing measures are
extremely effective in mitigating the effects of epidemics.
It is remarkable that the prediction made in April still
holds tightly within the confidence interval more than
two months later. A maximum of the number of cases is
predicted to occur between the 9th and the 14th of July.
B. The case of Finland
On January 29th Finland confirmed its first COVID-19
case, a 32-year-old Chinese woman from Wuhan having
sought medical attention in Ivalo and tested positive for
SARS-CoV-2. She was quarantined at Lapland Central
FIG. 2. Time history of the number of new cases per day.
Continuous blue line: daily confirmed cases from February
28th to April 13th used to adjust the model parameters. Con-
tinuous red line: numerical prediction assuming no further
changes in societal conditions. Broken black lines : 99% con-
fidence interval. Bars: actual daily data up to July 8th. Green
line is the 10-day average of the actual data.
Hospital in Rovaniemi. The woman recovered and was
discharged on February 5th after testing negative on two
consecutive days. Three weeks later, on February 26th,
Finland’s health officials confirmed the second case, a
Finnish woman, who made a trip to Milan and returned
on February 22th, tested positive at the Helsinki Uni-
versity Central Hospital. On February 28th, a Finnish
woman who had also travelled to Northern Italy, tested
positive by the Helsinki and Uusimaa Hospital District
and was advised to remain in home isolation [34].
These two latter cases mark the beginning of COVID-
19 epidemic in Finland, and the number of new cases was
then followed closely by the National Institute of Health
and Well being (THL) [35], advising the Finnish Govern-
ment the course of pandemic and the disease confinement
measures [36]. As a result on March 12th the Government
decides on recommendations to curb the spread of corona
virus by public events and workplaces closures. This was
soon followed on March 16th by Government decision on
lock down measures, to shut down all schools and most
government-run public facilities (theatres, libraries, mu-
seums etc.). In addition, at most 10 people were allowed
to participate in a public meeting, outsiders were forbid-
den from entering healthcare facilities and hospitals, and
travel cross the internal Schengen and EU borders were
limited to essential goods transportation, people having
to because of work, and citizens returning to Finland.
These measures were scheduled to be in place until April
13th, but were later extended to May 13th at which point
the pre- and primary schools were opened for the last two
weeks of the spring semester, while other measures were
kept in effect.
On March 21st the first death, an elderly individual
who lived in the Helsinki and Uusimaa hospital district,
was reported. On March 27th, the Parliament voted
unanimously to temporarily close the borders of the Uusi-
5maa region (area surrounding the capital Helsinki), which
had and still has the most confirmed cases. On April 15th
travel restrictions between Uusimaa region and the rest
of the country were lifted. In addition, from April 4th to
May 31st the Government decided to close all restaurants
and hotels. On June 1st onward the gradually opening of
country started by allowing the maximum number of peo-
ple to be increased to 50, opening restaurants and public
places such as museums as well as allowing sports events,
all of these "with special arrangements" to maintain suf-
ficient physical or social distance. Then according to gov-
ernment decision from June 15th on, travellers entering
from the Baltic countries and the other Nordic countries
except Sweden will no longer have to stay quarantined for
14 days, but other international travel restrictions were
kept. From July 1st onward Government decided that
the outdoor events with more than 500 people will be
allowed with the arrangements to keep sufficient physical
distance. Overall it is worth mentioning that people have
so far followed all the confinement measures, restriction
and recommendations by the Government very closely,
which is seen as a large reduction of reported daily infec-
tion cases to less than 10.
Due to the above mentioned travel restrictions air
travel has reduced to 2 - 3 % from mid-March to May
and to 6 - 7 % in June in comparison to the same months
last year (2019). The air travel volumes will very grad-
ually start increasing from the beginning of July on, as
the EU internal border restrictions are gradually started
to be lifted. Due to strong recommendation by the Gov-
ernment to avoid travelling within Finland during mid-
March to June period even the passenger volumes by rail-
ways have been running low, but expected to start pick-
ing up from mid-June on as people prefer having their
vacations in Finland. We estimate the travel volumes
only to about 20% the value before the epidemic.
Taking these measures into account we introduced
them in the model to modify the aerial, terrestrial and
casual mobilities along the time line of their introduction.
For the model there are four major events: (i) the 12-14
March closing down (with vt, reduced to 50 %, kT = 0.4),
(ii) the March 27th isolation of the Uusimaa region (caus-
ing drastic reduction of vt to 25% and kT = 0.1), (iii) the
April 15th lifting travel restrictions of the Uusimaa re-
gion (with vt and kT restored to the March values), and
(iv) the air travel reduction from March to June, (with
va changing from 2% in March - May to 7% in June).
In Fig. 3 we show one example of the intricate cal-
culation that resulted from the above described social
distancing measures. Observe that the averaged values
of daily cases follows remarkably well the averaged actual
data.
We have also performed a set of forty realisations and
averaged them to calculate the of 99% confidence interval
of the model predictions. The results are shown in Fig. 4.
Observe that the model works quite well over the whole
time interval, but little less so in between April 15th and
May 5th, when the Uusimaa area opened. This is possi-
FIG. 3. Time history of the number of new cases per day
in Finland. Continuous blue line: Actual data averaged over
7 days. Continuous red line: numerical prediction including
changes in social distancing. Bars: actual data taken from [32]
FIG. 4. Average over 20 realisations of the model calcula-
tions (red line) showing the of 99% confidence interval (black
broken kines) and the averaged data in green.
bly due to people’s heightened willingness after opening
to go visit their relatives and their summer cottages. As
we have no data of the number of people that travelled
by road during that lapse, we have not been able to take
it into account in the model. Just as a matter of curiosity
we made a calculation to predict the effect of train travel
passenger volumes starting from June 15th to increase
gradually up to 20% and air travel passenger volumes
gradually up to 7% of the values before the pandemic.
The results are depicted in Fig. 5 and show only a slight
increase in the number of daily cases to about a dozen
and persisting at that level throughout summer.
6FIG. 5. As Fig. 4 including in blue the prediction if trains and
airport start running on June 15th (trains 20% and airport
to 7%)
C. The case of Iceland
On January 29th, Chief Epidemiologist Thorolfur
Guđnason advised against unnecessary travel to China,
and recommended that people travelling from China un-
dertake 14 days quarantine upon returning to Iceland.
On the 31st of January, a meeting in the National Secu-
rity Council was scheduled with the Minister of Health
and Chief Epidemiologist. The Department of Civil Pro-
tection and Emergency Management (DCPEM) evoked
the National Crisis Co-ordination Center. By the 3rd
of February, Iceland had defined high-risk areas, includ-
ing Northern Italy and Tirol, earlier than other govern-
ments, taking stricter measures with a 14-day quarantine
requirement for all residents returning from those areas.
February 27th saw the first daily press conference, at-
tended by IcelandâĂŹs Chief Epidemiologist, Director
of Health and Chief Superintendent. The first case of
COVID-19 was confirmed in Iceland on February 28th.
This was a person arriving from Northern Italy. DCPEM
declared the alert phase. By March 6th over 30 imported
cases had been confirmed and the first two transmissions
within Iceland, traced to infected individuals who had
recently traveled to Northern Italy. The alert level was
raised to the emergency phase.
On March 13th, screening for the virus that causes
COVID-19 started among the general public. deCODE
genetics graciously offered to test everyone in the country
who wanted to be tested. At the same time, a ban on
gatherings of more than 100 people was announced and
then implemented on the 16th. High schools and Univer-
sities were closed, and operations of kindergartens and
primary schools were limited.
By March 31st, Iceland had limited gatherings to 20
people or fewer, closed sports clubs, hair salons, bars, and
similar establishments, implemented fines for breaching
the rules of quarantine, and became a party to an inter-
national contract which enabled the Icelandic authorities
to join European Union members in the procurement of
various healthcare equipment. April 2nd saw the tracing
app Rakning C-19 become available in the App Store and
Google Play to track the virus.
As a result of the quick action taken by the govern-
ment, results from initial screenings indicated a low rate
of infections among the general public. By April 21st, it
was announced that the ban on gatherings and school ac-
tivities would be relaxed, effective on May 4th 2020. The
limit on the number of people who may gather increased
from 20 to 50; pre-schools and primary schools reopened;
athletic and youth activities became unrestricted again.
On May 25th, gyms and swimming pools reopened and
operated with limitations, such as a maximum number of
guests. Gatherings of up to 200 people were allowed. All
restaurants and bars re-opened with a curfew of 11 PM
[37].
Taking these measures into account in the model we
changed only the mobility parameters on the dates men-
tioned. We considered domestic flights operating with
very few and diminishing number of passengers from the
beginning of the outbreak, while the international air-
port was getting many imported cases until March 16th,
when the aerial and terrestrial mobility were assumed
to be reduced by 70%, reflecting the full obedience of
the population to the confinement measures taken. Be-
tween April 2nd and April 9th a 90% mobility reduction
was achieved, but on May 5th the mobility increased to
60%. The random mobility was kept to the original value
of kT = 0.8, because of the uneven population density
in the island, as 62% of the population is concentrated
around the Reykjavik area, so it makes little difference if
kT is reduced.
In Fig.6 we show one realisation of the model and com-
pare it with the actual data, both averaged over 7 days.
We could say that in this case, the disease had been con-
trolled in the early days of May.
FIG. 6. (a) Time history of the number of new cases per day
in Iceland. Continuous blue line: Actual data averaged over
7 days. Continuous red line: numerical prediction including
the changes in social distancing mentioned in the text. Bars:
actual data taken from [32]
The borders opened on June 15th. Passengers arriving
in the country were given the option of taking a COVID-
719 test or undergoing quarantine for 14 days. Children
born in 2005 and later were exempt. Testing was offered
at KeflavÃŋk Airport and at other international ports
of entry. Passengers were also required to answer a pre-
arrival questionnaire, abide by sickness rules and were
encouraged to download the app, Rakning C-19. At the
same time, further relaxation of the ban on assembly took
effect. The number of gatherings increased from 200 to
500 and restrictions on the number of swimming pools
and fitness centers were reduced.
Considering these relaxations of the social distancing
measures, we performed a calculation on June 10th to try
predicting the effects that would result from this action.
In Fig.7 we show the results from the model averaging
over 20 realisations. We assume that one should expect
around 1.5 cases per 1000 passenger coming from abroad.
FIG. 7. (a) Average over 20 realisations of the time history
of the number of daily cases in Iceland. Continuous green
line: Actual data averaged over 7 days. Continuous red line:
numerical prediction including the opening of the airport in
Keflavik on June 15th. Broken lines: 99% confidence interval.
The results are encouraging, since the model is predict-
ing a tail of 2 to 3 new daily cases on average. Observe
that the confidence intervals are larger than in the cases
of Finland and Mexico. This is expected, since the pop-
ulation, and consequently, the number of cases is much
smaller. Despite the small number of cases predicted
when opening the airport, people in Iceland received a
warning, they were too relaxed in early June, particu-
larly young people thinking that the pandemic was over
in June, but after some new cases appeared after June
15th, they became more careful, scared and worried and
started behaving accordingly.
IV. DISCUSSION
We have presented a stochastic model of geographi-
cal spreading of infectious disease that differs in many
respects from other compartmental SEIRS type models,
commonly used to describe epidemic spreading. In par-
ticular, our model separates the disease-defining epidemi-
ological parameters from the ones that have to do with
geography, and people’s social habits. It also includes so-
cietal traffic and travelling infrastructure and passenger
flow networks based on roads, trains and airline routes.
Furthermore, it allows one to define mobility quantities
that could vary in time, to make predictions of future
scenarios of the epidemic.
There is a recent review [38] that discusses various
modelling approaches to study particularly the COVID-
19 pandemic, and the general comment is that for models
to be more predictive, one needs much more and precise
data. The fact that with the model presented here one
can make quite accurate predictions is due to its intrinsic
random nature, which allows to approach real situations
with very little information. This model has performed
well also with other viral diseases, as shown earlier with
the swine influenza [12]. With the present study we have
demonstrated that this model can be used for very differ-
ent scales of population and their densities as well as for
countries with different social structures and situations.
By studying the three countries presented here we are
able to learn several important lessons. First of all that
it could be unwise to lift the country or regional level
confinement measures, restrictions and recommendations
completely when the pandemic is still active in other
countries or regions, as it was demonstrated in the case
of Iceland and Finland. It shows that going back to a
normality as free as last year will not be possible for a
long time. Of course we hope that there is an effective
vaccine or treatment available soon. It should be noted
that in the case of Mexico the model prediction of the be-
haviour of the pandemic was made early in the so called
exponential phase, i.e. April 13th when the amount of
available information was small, yet it has followed the
actual number of cases very closely so far.
The second issue is that of the so called second wave,
to be expected around the end of this year or beginning of
next year. So far we have made the calculations assum-
ing that the countries remain very much isolated, with
very limited travel between them. In addition we have
used this model to foresee what could happen if the three
countries were made totally open by the end of this year.
The results are shown in Fig.8.
We observe that the rebound is greatest in Finland,
small but noticeable in Iceland and extremely small in
Mexico. This is understandable on the grounds that in
Finland a large portion of the population has not be-
come exposed during the first wave due to obediently
followed confinement measures, in Iceland this is not the
case, due to obediently followed confinement measures
and perhaps the most vivid population-wide testing and
tracking policy and in Mexico the pandemics following a
normal course infecting practically everybody and reach-
ing even the most remote areas of the country during the
first wave.
Perhaps one of the most important points of this com-
8FIG. 8. (a) Calculations comparing the number of daily cases
for the three countries in the hypothetical scenario that from
November 6th onward the mobility is reestablished as it was
in December 2019. Notice that the data for Mexico have been
divided by 10. (b) Same comparison for the total number of
infections in logarithmic scale.
parative study is that the timely social distancing and
confinement measures, as well as public restrictions and
recommendations are seemingly efficient ways to control
the disease spreading, especially when people follow them
tightly, as it is the case in Finland and Iceland both be-
ing sparsely populated and socially relatively homoge-
neous countries. In addition, in case of Iceland from the
very beginning of the epidemic the population-wide test-
ing and tracking served as an enhanced control and life-
saver. In case of Mexico imposing confinement measures
is more complicated, because of much larger population
and very large densely populated cities with huge socioe-
conomic differences. Still the authorities have managed
to slow down the speed of disease spreading. The price to
pay in all these three countries is that the pandemic will
be active for quite a while, but on the other hand our
understanding of confinement and prevention measures
has been tested and will allow to face the possible second
wave in a better way.
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